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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Appellant Webceleb, Inc., hereby states that no parent corporation or publicly held
corporation owns 10% or more of its stock.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California had
jurisdiction over Plaintiff Webeceleb, Inc.’s (“Webceleb”) claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§1331 and 1338.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291
because the appeal is from a final judgment.
This appeal was timely filed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §2107(a) and
Rule 4(a), Fed. R. App. P., in that the judgment of the district court was entered on
September 25, 2012, and the Notice of Appeal was filed with the district court on
October 23, 2012.
This appeal is taken from the Order Granting Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment and the Judgment in a Civil Case entered September 25, 2012.

1
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
TO BE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

Whether the district court erred as a matter of law in applying the artistic

relevance test to Defendants’ commercial use of the WEBCELEB mark.
B.

Whether the district court erred in granting Defendants motion for summary

judgment based on the Rogers artistic relevance test.
C.

Whether the district court erred in denying Plaintiff’s motion for further

discovery pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 9, 2010, Webceleb filed a complaint initiating this action
against Defendant Procter & Gamble, claiming trademark infringement pursuant to
15 U.S.C. §§1114 and 1125, and unfair competition under California Business &
Professions Code §17200, and seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief
and damages based on P&G’s infringing use of its federally registered
WEBCELEB mark in connection with an award category for P&G’s People’s
Choice Awards. ER415. On November 19, 2010, Webceleb filed a motion for
preliminary injunction seeking an order enjoining P&G from any further use of the
WEBCELEB mark in connection with the People’s Choice Awards or any other
P&G product or production. Id.
2
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Just prior to filing its opposition to Webceleb’s motion for preliminary
injunction on December 3, 2010, P&G voluntarily stopped its infringing use of the
WEBCELEB mark. Finding that the “substantive relief sought therein has been
voluntarily undertaken by Defendant The Procter & Gamble Company,” on
December 13, 2010, the district court denied Webceleb’s preliminary injunction
motion as moot, without prejudice to a future motion for injunctive relief if P&G
took action inconsistent with its representations that it would no longer use the
WEBCELEB mark. ER411-412.
On September 29, 2011, Webceleb and P&G filed a Joint Motion for Leave
to File First Amended Complaint. ER417. On October 7, 2011, the district court
granted this motion, and on October 11, 2011, Webceleb filed its First Amended
Complaint asserting the same claims as the original complaint, but adding
BermanBraun LLC and Microsoft Corporation as Defendants based on their use of
the WEBCELEB mark in connection with their WonderWall celebrity gossip
website. ER403-410. On December 16, 2011, BermanBraun and Microsoft
moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing, failure to state a claim, and
defenses based on First Amendment protections and a classic fair use. ER418. On
February 13, 2012, the district court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id.
On May 14, 2012, the district court issued a Case Management Conference
Order Regulating Discovery and Other Pretrial Proceedings (the “Scheduling

3
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Order”) setting a schedule for the case through trial. ER419. Pursuant to the
Scheduling Order, discovery was set to close on October 29, 2012.
On June 12, 2012, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment
based primarily on their First Amendment and fair use defenses. Id. On July 27,
2012, Webceleb filed its opposition, and on August 3, 2012, Defendants filed their
reply. ER420. On August 6, 2012, the district court cancelled oral argument.
ER421. On September 25, the district court entered an order granting Defendants’
motion for summary judgment and the clerk entered judgment for Defendants.
ER6-15.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Webceleb is an online independent music distribution platform and social
network dedicated to the discovery and promotion of independent musicians.
Through its web site at www.webceleb.com, Webceleb connects independent
musicians with fans looking for new music that is not being promoted by the major
commercial record labels and mainstream radio stations. Since early 2007,
Webceleb devoted all of its limited resources to developing and marketing an
innovative, internet-driven business model that lets music fans play a direct role in
the success of independent musicians.

4
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Webceleb’s History and Development
The concept for Webceleb was developed in early 2007 by Alexander Rolek,

Justen Palmer and Scott Fetters. ER 38. Webceleb was originally conceived as a
social website on which a wide variety of independent artists — musicians,
comedians, performance artists, models, photographers and others — could
showcase their talents. Id.
Webceleb.com evolved from this original concept, but consistently focused
on developing a strong brand identity devoted to promoting undiscovered
independent artists. ER38-39. This core value is the basis for Webceleb’s tag line
– “Discover. Be Discovered.” It is also at the very heart of Webceleb’s business
model, which has three key elements: (1) attract independent artists to post their
work on Webceleb; (2) market those artists by leveraging existing social
networking and quick information sharing websites such as Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube through the concept of “crowd sourcing”; and (3) monetize Webceleb by
selling the artists’ work through a unique profit sharing model in which the artist
receives the majority of the revenues, Webceleb receives a small percentage, and
the fans that buy the artist’s work actually receive a significant share of the
revenues generated by subsequent sales (this is referred to as the “Slice” revenue
model). ER38-42.

5
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Marketing and Brand Development
Webceleb’s entire business model relies on its brand identity. Webceleb

does all of its business using the WEBCELEB mark and www.webceleb.com
domain. Webceleb is the owner of U.S. Trademark Registration No. 3756711 for
the mark WEBCELEB in international class 042 for an internet based media
sharing platform, described more specifically in the registration as “Providing
temporary use of on-line non-downloadable software to enable uploading, posting,
showing, displaying, tagging, blogging, sharing, or otherwise providing electronic
media or information in the field of general interest over the Internet or other
communications network.” ER37-38.
Webceleb’s crowd sourcing business model channels and relies on the
power of social media sites like Facebook, YouTube, and quick information
sharers like Twitter. These sites are vital to the survival of Webceleb, which
leverages them to develop the Webceleb brand and promote the music and other
media hosted on Webceleb as these platforms can quickly drive huge amounts of
traffic to a particular song or artist. ER38-39. Facebook and Twitter sharing in
particular have been incredibly effective forms of marketing for Webceleb. 1
Webceleb also has marketed and promoted its web site through various live
music events and online competitions all directed to the independent music
1

Twitter is an important communication tool that is based on the broadcast of brief
messages called “tweets” to very large numbers of people.
6
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community. Since August of 2007, Webceleb has sponsored independent music
events at a range of venues and locations. ER42-43. Collectively these efforts
have developed a strong association between the WEBCELEB trademark and the
discovery and promotion of independent music. ER43-45.
C.

People’s Choice Awards Web Celeb Category
P&G is the owner of the annual People’s Choice Awards, which typically

airs each year on national television in early January. Unknown to Webceleb, the
People’s Choice Awards initiated a new award category for its January 2010 show
called “Web Celeb.” ER45. On January 6, 2010, when the People’s Choice
Awards show aired the results of the Web Celeb category for the first time,
Webceleb experienced an unprecedented increase in the number of visitors to its
web site. While Webceleb saw this spike in visits when it occurred, the company
did not understand that it was related to the People’s Choice Awards and only later
learned that P&G had created a Web Celeb category. Id.
During subsequent months there was no activity in connection with the
People’s Choice Awards and thus no detectable impact on Webceleb. However,
when P&G began its promotional campaign for the 2011 Awards show in midOctober of 2010, Webceleb saw a notable falling off of traffic to the Webceleb
website. ER46. At the same time, Webceleb detected an unexpected increase in
traffic across the Twitter platform relating to the keyword “webceleb.” This

7
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increased traffic was directly linked to People’s Choice Web Celeb voting as P&G
was using a Twitter device called a “hashtag” to insert the term “webceleb” as a
keyword in automatically generated messages – called tweets on Twitter – that
were broadcast with every vote that that is shared on Twitter. ER47-48.
Historically, Webceleb’s own tweets have always had a significant presence
in Twitter search results for “webceleb.” ER48. As a result of P&G’s Twitter
campaign using the keyword “webceleb,” every Twitter search for the term
“webceleb” was now dominated by scripted “tweets” automatically generated by
people voting for People’s Choice “Web Celebs.” Targeted and linked rich tweets
from Webceleb’s Twitter account were buried beneath the People’s Choice voting
tweets. Id. The People’s Choice Twitter campaign effectively drove Webceleb off
the Twitter field of interest, and destroyed Twitter as a platform for promoting
Webceleb. Id.
Defendants’ Microsoft and BermanBraun are partners in a celebrity gossip
website called WonderWall. ER50-54. The WonderWall web site was the official
sponsor of the People’s Choice Web Celeb award category and promoted the Web
Celeb category heavily on its web site at www.wonderwall.com. The WonderWall
web site included an entire section devoted to Web Celeb nominees, with
individual pages for each nominee. Each individual page included Facebook and

8
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Twitter sharing buttons to allow users to easily share their interest in a particular
WonderWall page and drive traffic to the WonderWall site. Id.
Microsoft and BermanBraun viewed their WonderWall Web Celeb section
as a brand franchise, and actively worked to develop and promote it using the
WEBCELEB mark. ER53. Thus, P&G used WonderWall’s sponsorship to
develop and promote the Web Celeb category of its People’s Choice Awards,
while Microsoft and BermanBraun used the Web Celeb category to develop and
promote its own Web Celeb branded celebrity gossip pages devoted to the latest
news on the Kardashians and other media celebrities.

III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court erred as a matter of law when it applied the Rogers artistic
relevance test to evaluate Defendants’ commercial use of the WEBCELEB mark in
connection with the People’s Choice Awards show and the WonderWall celebrity
gossip site. The Rogers test strikes an appropriate balance between First
Amendment protections and the public’s interest in avoiding confusion in cases
involving artistic use of culturally significant marks. Extension of the Rogers test
to cases involving non-artistic, commercial use of marks that are not culturally
significant, however, takes the test far beyond its legal underpinnings. This case

9
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involves commercial, infringing uses of Webceleb’s mark that does not implicate
the First Amendment concerns that the Rogers test evolved to address.
Even if applied here, Defendants’ use of the WEBCELEB mark was purely
commercial use that is not artistically relevant to any underlying work. Artistic
relevance requires an artistic use of the mark, not just any relevance to the
underlying subject matter. Here, it is at least a genuine issue of fact whether or not
Defendants’ use of the WEBCELEB mark is not artistically relevant and explicitly
misleading.
The district court also erred in denying Webceleb’s Rule 56(d) request that it
deny or defer the motion for summary judgment to allow for further discovery.
Webceleb diligently pursued discovery and identified specific discovery relevant to
genuine issues of material fact that needed to be obtained in order to respond to
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

IV. ARGUMENT
This Court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.
Szajer v. City of Los Angeles, 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011); Universal Health
Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 363 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004). “[R]eview is
governed by the same standard used by the trial court under Federal Civil Rule
56(c).” Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir. 1999). This

10
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Court “must determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and
whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.”
Universal Health Servs., 363 F.3d at 1019 (internal quotation marks omitted).
When the underlying facts are not in dispute, the court's only function is to
determine whether the district court correctly applied the law. Id.
“Summary judgment is appropriate only if, taking the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Corales v. Bennett, Inc., 567 F.3d 554,
562 (9th Cir. 2009). “A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of the
litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth.”
S.E.C. v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1982).
The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary
judgment is proper. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The
moving party must identify the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, or other evidence
that it “believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party satisfies
this initial burden, then the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that
summary judgment is not appropriate. Id. at 324. The opposing party’s evidence

11
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is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, to avoid
summary judgment, the opposing party cannot rest solely on conclusory allegations
but must designate specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Berg v.
Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986).
Due to the “intensely factual nature of trademark disputes,” pre-trial
dispositive motions are generally disfavored for trademark cases in the Ninth
Circuit. Intersteller Starship Services, Ltd. v. Epix Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th
Cir. 1999) (citing Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1356 n.5
(9th Cir. 1985)); see also Bell v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 539 F. Supp. 2d
1249, 1255 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
A.

The District Court Erred As a Matter of Law in Applying the Rogers
Artistic Relevance Test
The district court erred as a matter of law in its application of the artistic

relevance test to this case. The artistic relevance test is sometimes referred to as
the Rogers test in reference to the case Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.
1989), which developed the test in connection with an infringement claim
involving the title of a movie. Careful consideration of the development and legal
rationale fro the Rogers test establish that it should not have been applied in this
case.

12
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The Original Context for the Rogers Artistic Relevance Test

In Rogers, the iconic actress Ginger Rogers filed a Lanham Act claim to
prevent the use of the phrase “Ginger and Fred” as the title of a Fellini movie about
two fictional Italian dancers that imitated Ms. Rogers and Fred Astaire. Id. at 996.
Ms. Rogers claimed that the use of her name in the title of the movie created the
false impression that she sponsored, endorsed, or was otherwise involved in the
film. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding that
the use of Ms. Rogers’ name in the title of the movie was an exercise of artistic
expression rather than commercial speech. The district court then held that
“because the speech at issue here is not primarily intended to serve a commercial
purpose, the prohibitions of the Lanham Act do not apply, and the Film is entitled
to the full scope of protection under the First Amendment.” Id. at 997.
According to the district court in the Rogers case, the Lanham Act “cannot
apply to the title of a motion picture where the title is ‘within the realm of artistic
expression,’ and is not ‘primarily intended to serve a commercial purpose.’” Id. at
997 (citations omitted). The district court concluded that the use of the title
“Ginger and Fred” did not violate the Lanham Act “because of the undisputed
artistic relevance of the title to the content of the film. Id.
On review, the Second Circuit recognized that the district court’s holding
“would create a nearly absolute privilege for movie titles, insulating them from

13
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Lanham Act claims as long as the film itself is an artistic work, and the title is
relevant to the film’s content.” Id. The Court of Appeal sought instead to balance
the protection afforded to such titles against the reality that even truly artistic
works are subject to trademark restrictions:
Movies, plays, books, and songs are all indisputably works of artistic
expression and deserve protection. Nonetheless, they are also sold in
the commercial marketplace like other more utilitarian products,
making the danger of consumer deception a legitimate concern that
warrants some government regulation. Poetic license is not without
limits. The purchaser of a book, like the purchaser of a can of peas,
has a right not to be misled as to the source of the product.
Id. at 997 (citations omitted). “Though First Amendment concerns do not insulate
titles of artistic works from all Lanham Act claims, such concerns must
nonetheless inform our consideration of the scope of the Act as applied to claims
involving such titles.” Id. at 998.
Discussing the “hybrid nature” of titles of artistic works, the court
recognized that the title of a movie “may be both an integral element of the filmmaker’s expression as well as a significant means of marketing the film to the
public.” Id. Writers and filmmakers “frequently rely on word-play, ambiguity,
irony, and allusion in titling their works.” At the same time, consumers have a
dual interest in “not being misled and enjoying the results of the author’s freedom
of expression.” “For all of these reasons, the expressive element of titles requires
more protection than the labeling of ordinary commercial products.” Id. From
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this, the Second Circuit concluded that because “overextension of Lanham Act
restrictions in the area of titles might intrude on First Amendment values, we must
construe the Act narrowly to avoid such a conflict.” Id.
In attempting to craft a test that would appropriately balance these
competing interests, the Second Circuit expressly recognized that “the Act should
be construed to apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding
consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.” Id. at 999.
The court concluded that:
In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity’s name,
that balance will normally not support application of the Act unless
the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever,
or if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads
as to the source or the content of the work.
Id. In its subsequent explanation, the court makes it clear that this test is extremely
specific to the context of a title of an artistic work that uses a celebrity’s name, and
warns that the justifications for striking the balance in this way may break down in
the closely related context of “misleading titles that are confusingly similar to other
titles.” Id. at n.5. Even in such a similar situation, “the public interest in sparing
consumers this type of confusion outweighs the slight public interest in permitting
authors to use such titles.” Id.
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Ninth Circuit Application of the Rogers Test

In Mattel v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), this Court
bravely took on a similar battle between “Speech-Zilla” and “Trademark Kong.”
Id. at 898. Mattel had sued MCA Records for trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act based on its production, marketing, and sale of the song Barbie Girl
by the Danish band Aqua. The district court held that the song Barbie Girl is a
parody of Barbie and a nominative fair use that was not likely to confuse
consumers. Id.
On appeal, this Court recognized that in ordinary circumstances there is no
conflict between the source-identifying function of trademarks and First
Amendment rights. By way of example, the Court noted that “[w]hatever first
amendment rights you may have in calling the brew you make in your bathtub
‘Pepsi’ are easily outweighed by the buyer's interest in not being fooled into
buying it.” Id. at 900, quoting Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 960, 973
(1993).
The problem arises, however, when marks “transcend their identifying
purpose” and “enter public discourse and become an integral part of our
vocabulary,” because they assume a role “outside the bounds of trademark law.”
Id. at 900. Where a mark assumes such cultural significance, First Amendment
protections come into play, and “the trademark owner does not have the right to
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control public discourse whenever the public imbues his mark with a meaning
beyond its source-identifying function.” Id. See also New Kids on the Block v.
News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, when an artistic
work targets the original and does not merely borrow another’s property to get
attention, First Amendment interests weigh more heavily in the balance. Id.
(distinguishing Dr. Seuss Ents., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1400 (9th Cir. 1997).
The Court then discussed Rogers, noting that if a “pair of dancing shoes”
had been labeled “Ginger and Fred,” a dancer might have suspected that Rogers
was associated with the shoes. Id. at 901-902. But where the name “Ginger and
Fred” was the title of a movie, it was being used artistically and must be treated
differently. Id. at 902. The Court then adopted the Rogers balancing test in the
specific context of “literary titles,” and affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants.
This Court applied the Rogers artistic relevance test again in Mattel Inc. v.
Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003), another Barbie case
involving another artistic work. In Walking Mountain, Mattel sued a photographer
who produced and sold photographs of a nude Barbie doll in danger of being
attacked by vintage household appliances. Id. at 796. Mattel sued for
infringement of its Barbie trademark based on its use in the titles of the
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photographs. Id. The district court granted defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on the trademark claims, finding no likelihood of confusion as to
Mattel’s sponsorship of the allegedly infringing works.
Citing MCA Records, this Court again noted that when marks “transcend
their identifying purpose” and “enter public discourse and become an integral part
of our vocabulary” they assume a role outside the bounds of trademark law. As
such, when a “mark assumes such cultural significance, First Amendment
protections come into play.” Id. at 807. Adopting the holding of MCA Records,
the Court applied the Rogers artistic relevance test and found that the use of the
Barbie mark in the titles of the photographs was artistically relevant since Barbie
was the subject of the artistic expression parodying Barbie and the values she was
claimed to represent. Accordingly, the public interest in free artistic expression
“greatly outweighs its interest in potential consumer confusion about Mattel’s
sponsorship of [defendant’s] works.” Id.
In Walking Mountain, the Court chose not to apply the Rogers artistic
relevance test to Mattel’s trade dress claims, noting that trade dress claims or
trademark claims involving uses other than in the title of an artistic work may be
“incompatible with the Rogers test.” Id. at 808, n.14. Thus, consistent with both
the Rogers case and MCA Records, Walking Mountain again narrowly limited its
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application of the Rogers artistic relevance test to a situation where a culturally
significant mark was used in an artistically meaningful way in the title of the work.
This Court subsequently applied the Rogers artistic relevance test outside of
this narrow context in E.S.S. Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc.,
547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff E.S.S Entertainment operates a strip club
in eastern Los Angeles using the “Play Pen” mark. Rock Star sells a video game
that takes place in a fictional city called Los Santos that is modeled on Los
Angeles, and which includes a depiction of an East Los Santos strip club called the
“Pig Pen” that generally resembles the Play Pen. E.S.S. Entertainment sued Rock
Star on claims including trade dress infringement and unfair competition under the
Lanham Act. The district court granted Rock Star’s motion for summary judgment
based on a First Amendment defense.
None of the parties in E.S.S. Entertainment objected to application of the
Rogers test, and this Court found “no principled reason” not to apply the Rogers
artistic relevance test to the use of a trademark in the body of a work rather in the
title. Applying the test, the Court first found that the inclusion of a strip club
similar in look and feel to the Play Pen had “some artistic relevance” to the video
game. The Court next found no indication that the “buying public would
reasonably have believed that ESS produced the video game or, for that matter,
that Rockstar operated a strip club.” Id. at 1100.
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The Rogers Test Does Not Apply to Defendants’ Use of the
WEBCELEB Mark

The MCA Records and Walking Mountain cases applied the Rogers test in
the correct context of cases like Rogers itself that involved iconic marks being used
in the titles of highly artistic works. Application of the Rogers artistic relevance
test outside of that context pulls it from its moorings, transforming it into exactly
what the Second Circuit sought to prevent – a “nearly absolute privilege” against
valid Lanham Act claims.
The justification for First Amendment protection invoked in Rogers, MCA
Records, and Walking Mountain is simply not present here. The common thread in
those cases is a senior user of a culturally significant mark seeking to prevent the
use of its trademark in the title of an expressive work authored by a junior user
who intends an association with the senior user. Masters Software, Inc. v.
Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 725 F.Supp. 2d 1294, 1306 (W.D. Wash. 2010). In
that specific context, the Rogers artistic relevance test properly balances the strong
First Amendment interests of such a use of a culturally significant mark as part of
an artistic expression, against the limited risk of consumer confusion in most such
uses.
Here, however, the district court has applied the test in an entirely different
context, where the defendant has used a mark that is not culturally significant in a
commercial rather than artistic context. Defendants did not use the WEBCELEB
20
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mark as an artistically expressive communication. Their uses make no allusion to
Plaintiff Webceleb or its products and services. Rather, P&G used it as a label for
a category used in a commercial television award show, while Microsoft and
BermanBraun used it as a brand identifier for particular pages on their
WonderWall celebrity gossip website. In both circumstances, the Defendants
were:
expressing nothing more than what any user of a suggestive trademark
expresses when branding its product, and the Lanham Act's limitations on
such “expressions” do not violate the First Amendment. See, e.g., Mattel,
296 F.3d at 900 (noting that when “limited to [their] core purpose – avoiding
confusion in the marketplace – a trademark owner's property rights play well
with the First Amendment”).
Masters Software, Inc., 725 F.Supp. 2d at 1306; see also Dita, Inc. v. Mendez, No.
CV 10–6277 PSG (FMOx), 2010 WL 5140855 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2010)
(examining the required association between the junior and senior work required
for First Amendment protection).
Notwithstanding the unopposed application of the Rogers test to use of a
non-culturally significant mark in the body of a video game in E.S.S.
Entertainment, several courts have properly limited application of the Rogers test
to claims involving a mark that is “of such cultural significance that it has become
an integral part of the public’s vocabulary.” See Rebelution, LLC v. Perez, 732
F.Supp. 2d 883, 887 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Masters Software, Inc. v. Discovery
Commc’ns, Inc., 725 F.Supp. 2d 1294, 1306 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Dita, Inc. v.
21
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Mendez, No. CV 10–6277 PSG (FMOx), 2010 WL 5140855 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14,
2010). This cultural significance requirement reflects the underlying basis for the
balancing test as set forth in Rogers and in the MCA Records case, which
emphasized that when a mark “has taken on an expressive meaning apart from its
source-identifying function,” application of the traditional likelihood of confusion
test fails to account for the full weight of the public’s interest in free expression.
MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 900.
This understanding was reinforced in Walking Mountain, where the court
indicated that First Amendment protections “come into play” when a mark
transcends its source identifying purpose and enters the public discourse as part of
our vocabulary. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d at 807. The Ninth Circuit’s
examples of culturally significant trademarks are illuminating. Rolls Royce, BandAid, and Aspirin have all acquired transcendent meaning separate and distinct from
their source identifying function as a trademark. See MCA Records, 296 F.3d at
900.
Here, the district court erred when it applied the Rogers artistic relevance
test. The WEBCELEB mark has not transcended its source identifying purpose or
obtained cultural significance, and was used by Defendants as a branding device
not as an artistic reference to Webceleb’s service. This case is fundamentally
different than the use in the title “Ginger and Fred,” which uses Ms. Rogers’ name
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to evoke a connection with Ms. Rogers herself as a key aspect of the artistic
expression of the movie. It is fundamentally different than the use of the iconic
Barbie trademark in the title of the song or a photograph in which Barbie is the
focus of the artistic expression itself. Such cases demand broad First Amendment
protection, as the mark itself and its cultural relevance are central to the artistic
expression.
P&G’s use of the WEBCELEB mark as the name of an award category in a
commercial production like the People’s Choice Awards had no artistic
significance. Microsoft and BermanBrauns use of the WEBCELEB mark to brand
parts of their WonderWall gossip website had no artistic significance. Neither use
was an artistic reference to Plaintiff Webceleb or its product. Neither use was an
ironic use of a culturally significant name or mark.
Rather, both were classic commercial branding uses, as Defendants tried to
create a WEBCELEB franchise that they could commercialize across their internet
and television media platforms. Nothing more. Such use is not entitled to the
heightened First Amendment protection afforded by the Rogers artistic relevance
test. The district court erred as a matter of law when it applied this test, and its
order granting summary judgment should be reversed.
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The Rogers Artistic Relevance Test Does Not Preclude Plaintiff’s Claims
Even if this Court expands application of the Rogers artistic relevance test to

such commercial uses of a non-culturally significant mark, the district court erred
in granting summary judgment. The Rogers test states that in certain artistic
contexts, the balance between First Amendment interests and the public’s interest
in avoiding confusion will normally not support application of the Lanham Act
unless: (1) the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or
(2) if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the
source or the content of the work. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
Here, P&G used the WEBCELEB mark as a sponsored category label in
connection with its People’s Choice Awards Favorite Web Celeb. ER50-51.
Defendants Microsoft and BermanBraun used the mark in a stylized form under a
magnifying glass in the same way as Defendants’ flagship WONDERWALL
trademark, and in close connection with that mark as seen in the examples below,
taken directly from the WonderWall website:

The stylized version of the WEBCELEB mark on the right, was used in a position
and manner consistent with Microsoft and BermanBraun’s other marks such as the
WONDERWALL mark shown on the left. Id.
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While it did serve an identifying function in both uses, the WEBCELEB
mark as used by Defendants had no “artistic relevance” to the underlying work. In
considering this, it is important to recognize that the word “artistic” modifies the
word “relevance.” Relevance alone is not sufficient to bring a use within the first
prong of the Rogers test. The concept of “artistic relevance” is best understood by
reference to the cases in which this test was developed.
For example, in Rogers the title “Ginger and Fred” had artistic relevance to
the underlying work about dancers emulating Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire.
Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996-97. In MCA Records the title “Barbie Girl” had artistic
relevance to the underlying work, a social commentary about Mattel’s iconic doll
and its place in cultural values. MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 899. See also Cliffs
Notes v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, 886 F.2d 490, 491 (2d Cir. 1989)
(publication allegedly parodying plaintiff's publication named Cliff Notes); Twin
Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Pubs. Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1370 (2d Cir. 1992) (book
title referring to plaintiff's television series named Twin Peaks); ETW Corp. v.
Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918-19 (6th Cir. 2003) (painting referring to
plaintiff Tiger Woods); Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d at 796 (photographer
referring to plaintiff's famous Barbie doll); E.S.S. Entertainment, 547 F.3d at 1097
(video game maker allegedly referring to plaintiff's strip club).
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In this case, Microsoft and BermanBraun have consistently emphasized the
purely utilitarian function of their use of WEBCELEB, and make no effort to
attribute any artistic relevance to the underlying web pages bearing gossip about
Ashton Kutcher or Kim Kardashian. Unlike other cases applying the Rogers test,
Defendants’ use of the mark does not make artistic reference to Plaintiff
Webceleb’s product. In fact, Defendants consistently assert that their use of
WEBCELEB was purely descriptive, “simply describing the content of the page”
and “tersely and accurately describes the contents of the Award.” Thus,
Defendants’ – particularly Microsoft and BermanBraun which used the
WEBCELEB mark to brand the celebrity pages of their gossip website – cannot
attribute any artistic relevance to their use of WEBCELEB.
The evidence available to date further indicates that Defendants’ use of the
WEBCELEB mark was explicitly misleading. Defendants’ commercial use of the
mark confused consumers and drove huge volumes of traffic looking for P&G’s
Web Celeb category to Plaintiff’s indie music website. ER45-46. Thus, the
limited evidence developed to date indicates that even if the Rogers test applied
here, Defendants’ commercial use of the WEBCELEB mark does not come within
the protections of the First Amendment.
Finally, application of the Rogers test implicates several genuine issues of
material fact that are clearly the subject of dispute. The issues of whether
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defendants’ were engaged in a commercial or non-commercial use of the
WEBCELEB mark, whether their use of the mark had artistic relevance to the
underlying work, and whether or not Defendants’ use was explicitly misleading are
all factual issues that preclude granting summary judgment. See Parks v. La Face
Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (denying summary judgment under Rogers
test due to genuine issue of material fact regarding artistic relevance of use of
plaintiff’s name in the title of a song); see also Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d
1073, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (denying motion to dismiss, but noting factual issues
regarding whether or not the accused political advertisement was an artistic work
subject to the artistic relevance test). Thus, even if this Court expands the
application of the Rogers test to cases such as this, the district court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
C.

Webceleb Is Entitled to Further Discovery Pursuant to Rule 56(d)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)) provides that if a nonmovant

shows shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot
present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering
the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take
discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order. “The burden is on the party
seeking additional discovery to proffer sufficient facts to show that the evidence
sought exists, and that it would prevent summary judgment.” Chance v. Pac-Tel
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Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 1151, 1161 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Nidds v. Schindler
Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1996)). To meet this burden, the party
opposing summary judgment must file an affidavit specifying: (1) the specific facts
that party hopes to elicit from further discovery; (2) the facts sought exist; and (3)
the sought-after facts are essential to opposing summary judgment. Family Home
and Finance Center, Inc. v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 525 F.3d 822,
827 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Tatum v. San Francisco, 441 F.3d
1090, 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).
When a summary judgment motion is filed “before a party has had a realistic
opportunity to pursue discovery related to the theory of the case, district courts
should grant any 56(f) motion fairly freely.” Burlington Northern Santa Fe R.R.
Co. v. Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767,
773-774 (9th Cir. 2003). Continuance of a motion for summary judgment for the
purposes of discovery should be granted almost as a matter of course unless the
non-moving party has not diligently pursued discovery of the evidence. Id.
(citations omitted). “Summary denial is especially inappropriate where the
material sought is also the subject of outstanding discovery requests.” VISA Int'l
Serv. Ass'n v. Bankcard Holders of Am., 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986).
This Court reviews the district court's decision on a Rule 56(d) motion under the
“abuse of discretion” standard. Id. at 773.
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The district court brushed aside Webceleb’s Rule 56(d) request to defer or
deny Defendants motion for summary judgment to allow for discovery, stating in a
footnote that Webceleb’s counsel did not state that any of the materials sought in
discovery were “essential to his opposition.” ER14. “Absent such a showing, the
Court declines to deny or defer ruling on the motion.” Id. In fact, Webceleb’s
counsel clearly and consistently indicated that further discovery was necessary
with respect to specific genuine issues of material fact in dispute in the case,
including:
• Defendants’ use of WEBCELEB as a trademark (key documents showing
trademark use that were offered in support of Webceleb’s opposition brief
were received from Defendants just four days prior);
• Defendants’ decision to use the WEBCELEB mark;
• Any due diligence performed by Defendants to clear the mark before use;
• Commercial aspects of Defendants’ use of the mark including advertising
revenues and other commercial benefits derived from their use of the mark;
• Evidence relating to actual or potential consumer confusion relating to
Defendants’ use of the mark;
• All of Defendants’ uses of the mark across all media, including without
limitation “Web Celeb Ambush” videos which are believed to exist but have
not been produced;
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• When Defendants became aware of Plaintiff and their reaction to that
awareness;
• Defendants decision to stop using the WEBCELEB mark in response to
Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction; and
• Likelihood of consumer confusion and the various factual issues relevant to
the Sleekcraft inquiry.
ER16-20. Among these, several reflect genuine issues of material fact specifically
relevant to application of the Rogers artistic relevance test. For example, evidence
of actual or potential confusion goes directly to the “explicitly misleading” prong
of the Rogers test. Evidence regarding all uses of the WEBCELEB mark is
essential so that all of Defendants’ uses can be evaluated in the correct context
under the Rogers test. Evidence regarding commercial aspects of Defendants’ use
of the mark goes to the “artistic relevance” prong of the Rogers test. Ultimately, as
its counsel indicated in his declaration, this discovery was essential to Webceleb’s
ability to oppose Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
Moreover, Plaintiff diligently sought discovery from Defendants on all
topics relevant to this case. Discovery, however, was not a smooth process.
ER16-18. P&G resisted discovery, requiring Plaintiffs to seek the assistance of the
court via a motion to compel, and as of the date Webceleb filed its opposition brief
Microsoft had produced just sixty-eight (68) pages of documents. ER17-18. In
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response to Webceleb’s motion to compel, P&G had just recently produced
substantial additional materials, and Webceleb anticipated setting depositions of all
key witnesses promptly once it had sufficient document production from
Defendants. Id.
The pleadings closed in this case on March 29, 2012. Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment was filed on June 12, 2012, less than a month after a
schedule had been set in the case and five and a half months before the close of
discovery. Webceleb diligently sought discovery relevant to genuine issues of
material fact in dispute and necessary to its opposition to Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The district court’s summary refusal to grant even a brief
continuance to allow such discovery was an abuse of discretion warranting reversal
and remand for further proceedings.
D.

Defendants Use of WEBCELEB Was Commercial Speech.
While it erred in granting summary judgment based on the Rogers test, the

district court properly denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that its use of the WEBCELEB mark was not commercial speech. While
this issue is not the subject of a cross-appeal, it will be briefly addressed here as it
may be pressed by Defendants as an alternate basis for affirmance.
For purposes of the Lanham Act, noncommercial speech is speech not used
“in connection with a sale of goods or services.” Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer,
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403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005), quoting Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Seattle Lighting
Fixture Co., 345 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 2003). While commercial speech does
receive some First Amendment protection, the Lanham Act customarily avoids
violating the First Amendment by operating only when consumers are likely to be
misled or confused by the alleged infringer's use. See, Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)(noting that
there is no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial speech that
does not accurately inform the public about lawful activity); see also 6 J. Thomas
McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 31:142, at 31-229
(4th ed. 1996 & Supp. 2008) (describing low level of First Amendment protection
for misleading speech); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
960, 973 (1993) (noting that so long as trademark law “limits itself to its traditional
role of avoiding confusion in the marketplace, there's little likelihood that free
expression will be hindered”).
Here, Defendants’ use of the WEBCELEB mark was commercial.
WonderWall is a commercial, for profit, celebrity gossip website. The available
evidence confirms that WonderWall generates revenues through the sale of
advertising throughout its website. WonderWall uses its content – celebrity gossip
and images – to generate visits to its website and sells advertising on its various
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web pages on that website based on the number of “impressions” it gets for the
advertisement. ER50-53.
WonderWall used the WEBCELEB mark to brand particular content that it
displayed on its website – photos and information about PCA Web Celeb nominees
– and sold advertising space on those pages. P&G’s PCA website similarly
provides advertising for P&G’s own products as well as for various other
commercial businesses like WonderWall that sponsor the show. Id. P&G
similarly used the WEBCELEB brand to generate valuable page views on its
website and exploited those page views for their advertising value. Id.
Use of a mark “in connection with” the sale of goods or services does not
require that the term itself be used to sell something. See, e.g., PETA, 263 F.3d at
365. Where a web site presents commercial advertisements it is a commercial use.
For example, in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263
F.3d 359, (4th Cir. 2001) (“PETA”), the defendant operated a website at
www.peta.org purportedly on behalf of “People Eating Tasty Animals” and
asserted that the site was a parody of the plaintiff’s website. The Court of Appeals
confirmed that this was a commercial use because, even though the defendants’
website did not sell anything, it provided likes to “commercial operations offering
goods and services.” Thus, Defendants’ use of the mark was “in connection with”
the sale of goods and services and was a commercial use.
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As the district court properly held, the commercial use of the WEBCELEB
mark by Defendants to generate advertising revenues and other commercial
benefits at least raises an issue of fact.

V. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, Webceleb respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the order of the district court, vacate the judgment entered by the
district court, and remand the case to the district case for further discovery.
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